プロトタイプ (prototype) に基づく意味論では，ある語の意味を，複数の意味特徴の有無を束ねた集合として定義する伝統的な意味論の発想から脱し，各意味特徴に程度の差を認め，意味の定義というよりは意味の典型を与えようと試みる．プロトタイプ理論は，色彩語をはじめ感覚的，物理的な意味をもつ語彙へ適用され，成果をあげてきたが，では心理的，社会的な要素をもつ語彙へも適用できるのだろうか．この問題意識から，Coleman and Kay は，英語の lie （嘘）にプロトタイプ意味論の分析を加えた．
Coleman and Kay (43) の調査の手順と議論の展開は単純かつ明解である．論文の結論部によくまとめられているので，それを引用する．
We have argued that many words, and the word lie in particular, have as their meanings not a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that a thing or event must satisfy to count as a member of the category denoted by the word, but rather a psychological object or process which we have called a PROTOTYPE. In some cases, a prototype can be represented by a list of conditions; but these are not necessary conditions, and the evaluative logic according to which these conditions are found to be satisfied, or not, is in general one of degree rather than of simple truth and falsity. . . .
In particular, we formulated (on the basis of the sort of introspection usual in semantic and syntactic research) a prototype for the word lie, consisting of three elements: falsity, intent to speak falsely, and intent to deceive. Stories were then constructed which described speech acts embodying each of the eight possible combinations of these three elements; these were presented to subjects, to be judged on the extent to which the relevant character in the story could be said to have lied. The pattern of responses confirmed the theory. The stories containing and lacking all three elements received by far the highest and lowest scores respectively. Further, in comparing each pair of stories in which the first contained all the prototype elements of the second plus at least one more, the majority of informants always gave the higher lie-score to the first. Of the nineteen comparisons of this type, each of which turned out as predicted, eighteen produced proportions significant at the .01 level. We then compared each pair of stories which differed in the presence of exactly two elements, to see if these comparisons yielded a consistent pattern with respect to the relative importance of the prototype elements. A consistent pattern was found: falsity of belief is the most important element of the prototype of lie, intended deception is the next most important element, and factual falsity is the least important.
鮮やかに結論が出た．lie が lie であるための最も重要なパラメータ（プロトタイプ要素）は「話者が発話内容を偽と信じている」ことであり，次に「話者が相手を欺こうとしている」ことであり，最後に「発話内容が実際に偽である」ことと続く．この順で点数が加算され，総合得点が高いものほど嘘らしい嘘であり，低いほど嘘っぽくないということになる．どこからが嘘であり，どこからが嘘でないのかの判断は個人によっても場合によっても揺れ動くが，プロトタイプ的な嘘が何であるかの認識と，そこからの逸脱の度合いに関しては，母語話者の間でおよそ感覚が一致するということが突き止められた．
プロトタイプ意味論のエッセンスの詰まった，かつ分かりやすい研究である．
・ Coleman, L. and P. Kay. "Prototype Semantics: The English Word lie." Language 22 (1980): 26--44.
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