

# The Restoration Mind

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148. *Ibid.*, vol. 7, p. 21 (22 January 1666).  
 149. *Ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 223–24 (28 July 1666).  
 150. *Ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 263 (16 July 1668).  
 151. *Ibid.*, vol. 7, p. 370 (14 November 1666).  
 152. *Ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 373 (16 November 1666) and 389 (28 November 1666).  
 153. *Ibid.*, vol. 8, p. 543 (21 November 1667).  
 154. *Ibid.*, vol. 8, p. 554 (30 November 1667).  
 155. *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 132 (11 May 1663).  
 156. Balthazar de Monconys, *Journal des voyages*, 3 vols. (Lyon: Horace Boissat & George Remeus, 1665–1661), vol. 2, p. 18. Curiously, there seems to be no mention of this event in the voluminous Oldenburg correspondence.  
 157. William Munk, *Roll*, vol. 1, p. 224.  
 158. Samuel Parker, *An account of the nature and Extent of the divine dominion and goodnesse* (Oxford: William Hall for Richard Davis, 1666), pp. 66–67.  
 159. Robert Sharrock, *De finibus virtutis Christianae: The ends of Christian religion* (Oxford: Henry Hall for Richard Davis, 1673), 70–71, 114–15.  
 160. British Library, MS Egerton, 1632, ff. 42r–55r.  
 161. Joseph Glanvill, *Plus ultra: Or the progress and advancement of knowledge since the days of Aristotle* (London: Lames Collins, 1668), p. 14.  
 162. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.  
 163. See Robert G. Frank, Jr., “The Image of Harvey in Commonwealth and Restoration England,” in *William Harvey and his Age: The Professional and Social Context of the Discovery of the Circulation*, ed. Jerome J. Bylebyl (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 103–43, especially pp. 117–24.  
 164. Giovanna Ferrari, “Public Anatomy Lessons and the Carnival: The Anatomy Theatre of Bologna,” *Past & present* 117 (1987), pp. 50–106; Jan C. C. Rupp, “Matters of Life, and Death: The Social and Cultural Conditions of the Rise of Anatomical Theatres, with Special Reference to Seventeenth-century Holland,” *Hist. Sci.*, 28 (1990), pp. 263–87.

## 3

“A Duumvirate of Rulers within Us”:  
 Politics and Medical Pneumatology in  
 Restoration England

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ROBERT FRANK'S essay in this volume has demonstrated that the new anatomy placed emphasis upon the mechanical nature of anatomical and corpuscular function. This chapter also discusses Restoration concepts of the human body, but does so in terms of the metaphorical language used in competing theories about the relation of soul to body.

Indeed, thanks to the works of Charles Webster, R. M. Rattansi, Margaret Jacob, Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, and many others, our understanding of the close tie between political concerns and natural philosophy during and after the English Revolution has been greatly improved.<sup>1</sup> Of particular importance was the idea of the cosmic order maintained by God, which was promoted by liberal Anglican natural philosophers and priests and was subsequently elevated to the hegemonic worldview owing to the magnificent achievement of Newton.<sup>2</sup> After the Restoration, the alternative worldviews, some magical, some atheistic, some pantheistic, which had been freely advocated during the Interregnum by religious and political radicals, were refuted and scorned by the liberal establishment, who eventually marginalized themselves into the clandestine periphery of the early Enlightenment.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to this well-charted fusion of Restoration politics and the mechanical view of the world, the cultural and political matrix involving radical changes in the perception of man (as microcosm) has not yet been studied in a systematic manner. The scenario of the political promotion of the mechanical philosophy applies to a part of the transformation of the science of man in

late-seventeenth-century England (which was then called "anthropology"), for some philosophers and physicians claimed that the same laws of motion regulate phenomena both in the human body and in the external world.<sup>4</sup> This "anthropology" had, however, a distinctive feature, particularly because an overwhelming majority believed that humans possess a substance that defies the reasoning of a mechanical philosophy, i.e., the soul. Hence, there existed the problematic of the human soul and its relation to the body, which were different from, although related to, questions about the mechanical world. The science of the soul (which was called "pneumatology" or "psychology") became a fashion during the latter half of the seventeenth century, reflecting the urgent intellectual and ideological need to reconceptualize the place of man's soul in the mechanized worldview.<sup>5</sup>

Some aspects of the link between pneumatology and ideology have been well surveyed. From the beginning, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century fashion of philosophical discussion of the soul, and particularly of its immortality, was a product of the Catholic Church's desire to combat heresy. It was largely initiated by the attempt of Pope Leo X's Lateran Council of 1513 to prove the immortality of the soul by arguments based on reason (i.e., not on faith). Many writers on the topic, such as Descartes and Gassendi, well aware of the ecclesiastical roots of the discussion, mentioned the eighth session of the Lateran Council when discussing the problem.<sup>6</sup> Pneumatology was also an ideological device to prevent the atheistic, immoral, libertine attitude that was perceived to be widespread at the time. Especially during the Restoration, when the court of Charles II was notorious for its libertine promiscuity (which often was attributed to the spread of Hobbesian materialism), many natural philosophers were desperate to refute atheism and materialism, to prove the immortality of the soul, and to remind people of life after death.<sup>7</sup> Some of them, including "the moderns" like Joseph Glanvill, even tried to turn the clock back and to show the reality of witchcraft and the world of spirits, in order to prevent sadducean immorality.<sup>8</sup> The enormous effort invested in demonstrating the immortality of the soul in the early modern period was due to the keen concern to counter the materialist or mortalist heresy and to maintain the social and moral order.

Pneumatology had even more straightforward connection with politics, in that the former rarely failed to employ the language of politics to conceptualize the relation between the soul and the body, and between "higher" faculties of the soul (e.g., reason

and will) and its "lower" faculties like sense, imagination, passions, and appetites. Ever since Plato, whose *Phaedrus* analogized the soul to a charioteer (reason) driving a pair of horses (passion and appetite), philosophical and medical discourse on the soul and its relationship with the body had been closely framed around the hierarchical politics in the Great Chain of Being: the soul and its higher faculties should control and govern, whereas the body and the lower mental faculties must submit and obey.<sup>9</sup> In the early modern period, this was still largely the case, with physicians and metaphysicians making generous use of political language to make sense of the workings of the human mind and the relation between the higher faculties and the lower ones, best exemplified in the engraving from *The Use of the Passions* translated from the French in 1649.<sup>10</sup>

These things considered, it seems worth asking whether the political upheavals of the English Civil War and the Restoration affected and molded contemporary pneumatology. The aim of this paper is to examine the most clear-cut example of linking politics and man, as expressed in the works of Walter Charleton, one of the most prominent physicians and medical writers of his time, and perhaps best known through John Dryden's famous poem, "To my Honor'd Friend, Dr. Charleton" (1662). I shall argue that Charleton's experience of the Civil War, the Interregnum, and the Restoration, and his views of those political upheavals, were directly embodied into his account of the passions of the soul, and the soul's relation to the body. The first part of this essay will briefly outline the intellectual elements of Charleton's understanding of the soul, his criticism of Descartes, and his debt to the contemporary natural philosophers and metaphysicians. The second part will show that Charleton's account of the passions of the soul reflected the mid-century political turmoil he lived through, and that the same principle of government was expressed both in his medical understanding of man and in his political writings.<sup>11</sup>

#### CHARLETON'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES

Charleton has been unduly neglected in the history of science, perhaps because he has been overshadowed by Thomas Willis, his eminent Oxford colleague. Both Charleton and Willis were interested in the chemistry of van Helmont, whose works Charleton translated in the 1640s and 1650s, in comparative anatomy

of the brain and nervous system, and in Gassendist corpuscular philosophy.<sup>12</sup> Here I would like to concentrate on Charleton's criticism of Cartesian dualism, with a brief look at the intellectual context of these ideas.<sup>13</sup>

After the enthusiastic acceptance of the the Cartesian system in the 1640s by Kenelm Digby and the young Henry More had faded, many English philosophers assumed a critical attitude toward Descartes and his dualism.<sup>14</sup> Thomas Hobbes, who had already contributed a very hostile objection to *Meditations on First Philosophy* in 1640, launched his fully developed out-and-out materialistic interpretation of man in *Leviathan* (1651), in which he completely ignored Descartes's claim that mental processes themselves are irreducible to bodily ones.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, at Cambridge, Henry More increasingly departed from his French mentor, as he grew to be a mature philosopher in his own right.<sup>16</sup> At Oxford, it seems that the writings of Gassendi, the French archrival of Descartes, exercised more influence on natural philosophers like Thomas Willis, who developed a physiology and pathology based on the Gassendist notion of the corporeal soul, and publicized it at his Sedleian lectures at Oxford in the early 1660s, and elaborated on them in *De Anima Brutorum* (1672).<sup>17</sup> This Oxford Gassendist tradition subsequently culminated with John Locke (who attended Willis's lectures) and his criticism of Descartes, which is found in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690).<sup>18</sup>

Charleton played quite an important part of the English Gassendist criticism of Descartes, especially by making Gassendi's ideas available to English readers in *Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana* (1654).<sup>19</sup> Moreover, Charleton himself issued the most substantial criticism of Descartes's dualism (largely from Gassendist view) in his *Natural History of the Passions* (1674).<sup>20</sup> The core of the disagreement between Descartes and Gassendi-Charleton was whether man has only one soul or two. Criticizing Descartes's theory of the single soul, Gassendi maintained that there are two souls, one corporeal and the other incorporeal, and endowed the corporeal and incorporeal souls with different faculties and different natures: the former soul was material, the principle of life and of "phantasy," by which term he meant all mental activities that involved corporeal images; the latter was incorporeal, immortal, and the basis of the faculty of "intellectus," whose uniqueness lay in that it enabled man to think without images (e.g., forming a universal concept).<sup>21</sup> Charleton had been well versed in Gassendi's system of

the dual soul long before the *Natural History*, and first expressed definitive support for Gassendi's idea in a philosophical digression in *Ephesian Matron* (1659), an adaptation of Peronius's tale.<sup>22</sup> He remained convinced of the theory of the dual soul, and again endorsed the Gassendist notion that the two souls, one rational and the other sensitive, are "coexistent, conjunct, and cooperating" in man in *Enquiries into Human Nature* (1680), a collection of lectures delivered at the Royal College of Physicians of which he was president.<sup>23</sup>

As a criticism of the Cartesian dualism, Charleton's *Natural History* hit the nail on the head, for it posed to Descartes the question which, at last, he admitted he could not answer—how can the soul and the body interact with each other? Urged by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia to explain the enigma of the mind-body interaction, Descartes produced *Les passions de l'âme* (1649).<sup>24</sup> In the work, Descartes rejected the widely held belief that the passions occur because of the conflicts between "the lower part of the soul, which we call 'sensitive' and the higher or 'rational' part of the soul—or between the natural appetites and will."<sup>25</sup> Descartes's rejection of the idea was closely connected with one of the fundamentals of his system, the indivisibility of the soul: "there is within us only one soul, and this soul has within it no diversity of parts: it is at once sensitive and rational, too."<sup>26</sup> Given that the soul is indivisible and that there is only one soul, "It is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be observed in us to oppose to our reason."<sup>27</sup> Descartes thus concluded that the passions were nothing but the soul pulling the pineal gland to one side and the body to the other.

Charleton stood up to defend what Descartes rejected and issued pointed counter criticisms, focusing his argument directly on the passage of *Les passions* cited above. As an anatomist, he protested that the anatomical structure of the pineal gland did not allow it to perform the role Descartes ascribed to it.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Charleton was well aware of the built-in fundamental difficulty of Cartesian dualism: how can interaction be possible at all between two entirely different things? Even if one admitted Descartes' model of the pineal gland bending to one side and the other, Charleton argued that Descartes left it inconceivable, "how an immaterial agent . . . comes to move by impulse a solid body."<sup>29</sup> This point was widely observed as the most serious flaw of Descartes's dualism: Francis Burman, for example, pressed Descartes into a corner by asking, "How can the soul be affected



by the body and vice versa, when their natures are completely different?"<sup>30</sup>

A solution to the difficulty was possible, Charleton maintained, only by introducing a medium that would bridge the gap between the soul and the body:

It seem'd to me unintelligible, how an agent incorporeal, but not infinite, such as the rational soul by her excellent faculties and proper acts appears to be, can act physically in and upon a gross and ponderous body, such as ours are, immediately or without the mediation of "a third thing"; which though corporeal too, yet be of a substance so refined and subtle, as to approach somewhat neerer to the nature of a pure spirit, than the body itself does.<sup>31</sup>

Instead of the Cartesian identification of the soul as immaterial substance and the body as matter, with absolutely nothing in between, Charleton conceived of a gradual process. To ensure that the mind-body interaction took place, "a third thing," or Gassendi's corporeal soul, between the gross matter and the purely incorporeal spirit was necessary.<sup>32</sup>

Charleton probably found it easier to accept this "third thing," partly because it had been established in the late sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century medical doctrine of the animal spirits, which no doubt Charleton imbibed as a medical student at Oxford in the 1630s. In his *Treatise of Melancholie* (1586), Timothy Bright wrote there are three things in man, i.e., the body, the spirits, and the soul. Among these three, the spirits played the role of the medium between the two:

as it is not possible to passe from one extreme to an other, but by a meane; and no meane is there in the nature of man, but spirit; by this only the bodie affecteth the mind.<sup>33</sup>

Likewise, Lazare Rivière, an eminent professor of medicine at early-seventeenth-century Montpellier, wrote that the spirits were a medium of the soul and the body, "leaning as it were to both natures; . . . which indeed are material, but in tenuity ambitious of the nature of things immaterial," and in an anonymous M.D., *Anthropologie Abstracted* (1655), said that the animal spirits were "almost immaterial."<sup>34</sup> In contrast to Descartes who claimed that there are only two kinds of substances, and that the animal spirits are nothing but matter, many medical writers around Descartes's time thought that humans embodied an uninterrupted continuum.<sup>35</sup> Charleton shared the earlier view

that nature proceeds by gradation from the body to the soul, rather than by jumping from one to the other.

Another context for Charleton's adoption of the theory of the dual soul was religion. Charleton probably shared with Willis the view that by positing the corporeal soul, one can by contrast secure a more solid place for the incorporeal one, thus upholding the doctrine of the soul's immortality.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, Charleton found that Henry Hammond, an eminent Anglican High-Churchman active at Oxford during the Civil War and the Interregnum, stated that man essentially is composed of three elements.<sup>37</sup> In his scriptural exegesis, Hammond commented on a passage in 1 Thessalonians to claim that man consists not only of an immortal spirit and physical body, but also of a "sensitive, mortal soul," which is endowed with "animal and sensitive faculty," and is "common to man with beasts." Charleton cited Hammond's commentary verbatim, stating that the association of the theory of the dual soul with Manichaeism was thus cleared and the theory was indeed "dangerous to none, terrible only to the unlearned."<sup>38</sup> Charleton must have been particularly happy in drawing support from Hammond's work, since they were both royalist Episcopalians, and they almost certainly met at Magdalen Hall at Civil War Oxford, which was Charleton's *alma mater* and where Hammond stayed from 1643.<sup>39</sup> With the help of Hammond's work, Charleton could portray the Gassendist idea of the dual soul as religiously acceptable and even desirable.

Charleton's criticism of Descartes was thus largely a product of the intellectual milieu of mid-century Oxford, the Oxford of Harvey, Willis, and Hammond. However, another Oxford—an Oxford that was a royalist fortress during the Civil War—loomed large in his account of the passions of the soul. The next section will look into the jolt of the political upheavals on Charleton's representation of the passions and his understanding of man.

#### CIVIL WAR IN MAN AND IN THE COMMONWEALTH

We should start by taking a close look at the rhetoric found in Charleton's and his contemporaries's accounts of the passions of the soul. From the beginning, Charleton's discourse unfolded by means of political metaphor. Following the old tradition which Descartes rejected, his basic assumption was that the passions were warfare, an internal strife. Since they were a contest, Charleton claimed, Descartes's doctrine of a single soul in man could

not explain the phenomena of the passions, for "to conceive that one and the same simple thing, such as the reasonable soul is rightly presumed to be, can be repugnant to itself . . . is manifestly absurd." In order for a war to take place, there should be (at least) two contestants.<sup>40</sup>

The passions or the internal warfare in man had been conceived by early modern medical and philosophical writers as a conflict between purely spiritual mental faculties (such as reason and will) and those performed with the help of the body (such as imagination and appetites), with the passions being identified with the latter.<sup>41</sup> Those two contesting parts of man were nearly always understood in terms of hierarchical politics. We often find that the higher faculties are depicted as chiefs, princes, or commanders, and the lower faculties are characterized as the instruments and servants of the higher. Daniel Sennert distinguished "the animal faculties into the sensitive, motive, and Prince," and André du Laurens, a late-sixteenth-century French doctor, wrote that among the mental faculties of imagination, memory, and reason, reason was "the principal and chiefe" and the rest were reason's "ordinary handmaidens."<sup>42</sup> In his *Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man* (1640), Edward Reynolds, an eminent Anglican prelate of the earlier half of the seventeenth century, looked at the passions as an instrument by which the reason and will govern the man: when the passions follow the dictate of higher faculties, they are "of excellent service to man," and help him to achieve virtue. J. F. Senault's work on the passions recommends its readers to make a good use of the passions, for "not to employ them in the course of our life, is to render useless one of the most beautiful parts of our soul."<sup>43</sup>

The conceptualization of the two parts of a man striving with each other was thus vertically framed, with the fixed role assigned to each: the higher commands, the lower obeys. Reynolds wrote: "There is in man's faculties a natural subordination, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher."<sup>44</sup> As an instrument, the body and the lower faculties were denied any independent action: since "the dignity of passion chiefly consists in a consonance and obedience to the prescription of reason," the lower part of man "ought not to have any commanding or moving power, but onely instrumentall, ministeriall, and conveying."<sup>45</sup> In other words, there should be one single source of command. With the conspicuous use of the language of politics, Bright denied the body and the animal spirits any freedom of action,

else there should be more begginings and causes then one, in one nature: which popularity of administration, nature will none of, not yet any holygarcicall or mixt: but commandeth only by one soveraigne commander.<sup>46</sup>

In this hierarchically structured conception, man was modelled after a commonwealth which consisted of the commanding higher sovereign part and the strictly subordinate "instrumental" part.

Accordingly, when the lower faculties disobey dictates of the higher ones and follow their own course, it is destructive to the person:

if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become subject only to their own lawes, and encroach upon Reason's right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannical.<sup>47</sup>

The lower faculties are, analogized Reynolds, "the best servants, but the worst masters" in the little commonwealth of man "if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects."<sup>48</sup> In short, the corruption of passions consists in "the independence thereof upon its true principles [i.e., commands of reason]," which would result in a masterless world, or a world turned-upside-down, "as if a waggoner committing himselfe to the wild and unswayed fancie of his horse."<sup>49</sup>

In the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century, the language of hierarchical politics was a common and integral part of the understanding of man. Man, like the commonwealth, had two parts in him: one should be commanding and governing the inferior, the other is subordinated by and working for the superior. To a certain extent, Charleton employed the same rhetoric, emphasizing the erotic relation between the rational soul and the sensitive soul. The power and faculties proper to the rational soul, wrote Charleton, "vastly transcend" those of the sensitive soul; the former employs the sensitive soul as an instrumental medium between her and the body, "according to her sovereign will and pleasure."<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, Charleton was departing from the former rigid hierarchial understanding of the internal politics in man. This is most obvious in his assigning a certain kind of autonomy to the "lower" sensitive soul. Charleton's sensitive soul was relatively independent from the rational, because in controlling life and sense, it follows its own principle of seeking pleasure and

avoiding pain, whose ends were the preservation of the body and the propagation of the species.<sup>51</sup> The hedonistic principle of pleasure and pain, or "Joy and Grief" as he put them, holds sway over the rational soul and manages the whole man: "Joy and Grief are the two points in which all human actions end."<sup>52</sup> Indeed, the sensitive soul led by the principle of seeking pleasure was the most important key to happiness and virtue in man: in his *Epicurus' Morals*, he wrote that "pleasure seems to be not onely a good, but also the essential reason, or very root of good."<sup>53</sup>

Charleton's conception of man was, therefore, no longer that of a mere rational animal, in the sense that reason was not the single source of command or the only proper governing principle in man, and the corporeal soul acquired its own principle based on the bodily concern. Accordingly, he stated that one has to admit the coexistence of the dual principles:

because man is constituted propens to passions, he is not therefore the less perfect, but rather the more capable of pleasure from the right use of the good things of this life: and by consequence, that nature by making him *zoon patheticon*, hath therein signalized both her wisdom and indulgence.<sup>54</sup>

The passions, rather than reason, characterized the man, and man's happiness was to be achieved by letting the autonomous hedonistic propensity pursue its own way, rather than by subordinating the bodily appetite through the use of reason.

Charleton's concept of man was therefore dangerously close to Epicurean hedonism in its heretical sense, which alarmed many of his contemporaries. They found in Hobbes's writings, especially, the most horrible expression of Epicurean hedonistic psychology, and were desperate to refute what they regarded as an anti-religious, immoral, and libertine conception of man.<sup>55</sup> William Bates, a Presbyterian religious writer, was anxious to refute materialism and determinism by reinforcing the former hierarchical conception of man's higher and lower faculties, establishing the rational will's freedom and its control over the appetites that were determined by pleasure and pain.<sup>56</sup> Such thinkers must have been horrified at the Epicurean concept of man implied and sometimes expressed in Charleton's *Ephesian Matron*, in which he narrated a story of a widow, virtuous and weeping over her deceased husband, being overwhelmed by carnal desire and eventually making love with a stranger just beside her husband's coffin. From this piece of what I would term natural philosophi-

cal pornography, he not only drew a moral regarding the imperious power of carnal pleasure over reason, but also maintained that so-called "Platonique" love is just another name for carnal lust which also seeks the propagation of the species.<sup>57</sup>

In *Paradise Lost*, (book 12, lines 79–101) Michael reveals to Adam the relation to inner and outer freedom, explaining that to have true "Libertie," a man must be sure that "upstart Passions" must obey the "Reason," or else the uncontrollable passions "catch the Government" of the individual. Using similar political metaphors (ultimately to enhance a royalist position), Charleton considers the more autonomous and powerful status given to the "lower" soul greatly affected the conceived structure of internal politics in man. Most importantly, the sensitive soul's loyalty to the principle of pleasure and pain was the rationale for its disobedience to the dictates of the reason:

though she [the sensitive soul] owes obedience to the commands and dictates of her superior, the rational soul: yet being by so strict a ligue, and as it were a conjugal union affianced to the body, she is strongly inclined to prefer the conservation of that her favorite, to all other relations; and accordingly to gratify and indulge it even in those things that are prohibited by religion and reason.<sup>58</sup>

Instead of the former built-in subordination, the "lower" part of man, i.e., the body and the sensitive soul, was given an integral subversiveness to challenge its superior. This bold, determined, and defiant nature Charleton assigned to the bodily appetites and passions contrasts strikingly with the sneaky and cheating usurpation described by du Laurens:

fearing herself [love] too weake to incounter with reason, the principal part of the minde, she posteth in haste to the heart, to surprise and winne the same, . . . she afterward assaileth and setteth upon reason, and all the other principal powers of the minde so fiercely, as that she subdueth them, and maketh them her vassals and slaves.<sup>59</sup>

Charleton's sensitive soul was thus not a mere disobedient servant or a mismanaged instrument, but one of the "duumvirate . . . of rulers contending for superiority within us." The sensitive and the rational souls were "two distinct agents . . . coexisting within us," and equals when they contest, "reciprocally clashing, and contending for superiority," fighting with each other until one knocks out the other, with the possibility of either side winning.<sup>60</sup>



The shift in the understanding of the internal politics of man was partly due to Charleton's endorsing Epicurean psychology, as I have suggested. There is, however, a clear sign that the jolt of the English Civil War, the victory of the Parliament (or "rebells"), and the Restoration affected Charleton's conception of the relation between the rational and sensitive souls.<sup>61</sup> In his *Natural History of the Passions*, Charleton narrated a full story of the civil war in man.<sup>62</sup> Let us listen to his narrative.

From the beginning, the problem was not a mere disobedience but a strife between the two agents of almost equal power, or "dire conflict of the sensitive appetite with reason," which took place because the former "proves deaf to the voice of reason advising the contrary." And this disobedience would grow into a total rebellion:

Yea sometimes grown weary of subjection, she takes occasion to cast off her yoke of allegiance, and like proud and insolent rebell, aspires to unbounded license and dominion.<sup>63</sup>

Once the warfare started, it would not cease until "one of the combatants hath overcome and brought the other to submission." Sometimes, the victory falls to the right side, and the rational soul triumphs over the sensitive, or, as Charleton put it, "the prince overpowering the rebell." But Charleton knew that the superior rational soul would be sometimes defeated:

the event of this combat is often so unhappy, that the nobler part is subdued and led captive by the ignoble: . . . When the divine politie of the rational soul being subverted, the whole unhappy man is furiously carried away to serve the brutish lusts of the insolent usurper, and augment the triumphs of libidinous carnality.<sup>64</sup>

The result of the defeat of the reason and its usurpation by the carnal appetite would entail man turning into a beast, a conclusion that could naturally be expected from Charleton, who was such a determined royalist that he proudly bestowed the honorific of "physician" upon the late Charles I on the title page of *Physiologia*.

In this work, which was published during the Interregnum (1659), Charleton wrote that the rational soul (or "a monarch") might sometimes be inclined by the sway of his servants. At that time he was just a bad loser, insisting that the defeat of the rational soul/monarch was "without either subjection of his person, or diminution of his power."<sup>65</sup> With the Restoration, however,

Charleton, the royalist, had his day. When he composed his *Natural History* in 1674, Charleton had witnessed final justice being executed upon the rebels, with Charles II back on the throne, and the Stuart monarchy restored. Accordingly, he joyfully included this account of the restoration of the rational soul and the defeat of the usurpers:

Nay sometimes reason, after she hath been long held captive, breakes off her fetters; and remembering her native sovereignty, grows conscious and shamed of her former lapse: and thereupon with fresh courage and vigour renewing the conflict, vanquishes and deposes the sensitive soul with all its legions of lusts, and gloriously re-established herself in the throne.<sup>66</sup>

After the restoration, the rational soul whips some treasonous rebels, pardons others, and rectifies her conduct to "secure her empire for the future, and expiate the faults of her male-administration in times past."<sup>67</sup> Just like a phoenix, the immortal soul reassumed its sovereignty.<sup>68</sup>

Charleton's account of the course of the passions of the soul transparently reproduced the political upheavals of the mid-century: the Civil War, Parliament's victory, and the Restoration of Charles II. There is, therefore, good reason to suspect that the autonomous status Charleton gave to the "lower" sensitive soul and its built-in subversiveness against the rule of the rational soul, was due to the impact of his experience of the Civil War.<sup>69</sup>

This seems all the more likely, because the Civil War convinced Charleton and many others of the necessity of having a king preside over a plurality of authorities, rather than the contemporary French absolutist model of the king as the single source of power. Despite the early Stuarts and Robert Filmer, the absolutist idea of a single sovereign authority which is unrestrained by law, contract, or custom, was never widely accepted among the English in the seventeenth century.<sup>70</sup> Rather, even as they rejoiced at the return of the king, many preferred balanced polity, in which the authority of the Crown was one of the authorities which should govern the commonwealth.<sup>71</sup>

Although Charleton was loyal to the Royalist cause during the Civil War and the Interregnum, and although he enthusiastically welcomed the Restoration (he wrote a eulogy for the occasion), he shared the view that the Crown was not the single source of political power. Here his work on Stonehenge may serve as evidence that Charleton believed in mixed or limited monarchy.



In the work dedicated to Charles II, he made an antiquarian speculation on the "ancient constitution" and on the source of the king's power in the age when Stonehenge was built. The monumental ruin was, Charleton argued, not a Roman temple as Indigo Jones had maintained, but the Royal court of the Danes, where they assembled to elect their kings, and "to consult and vote about matters of state of great importance."<sup>72</sup> He went further to claim that the assembling and voting of the people such important elements of the king's sovereignty that "the place and ceremonies were essential parts of his right to sovereignty, and the votes of his electors much more valid and authentique, for being pronounced in that forum."<sup>73</sup> One is tempted to see the work as Charleton's attempt to remind the king of the importance of the people's right to assemble and to represent some source of authority.<sup>74</sup> Also, in his *Harmony of Natural and Positive Divine Laws*, Charleton expressed a critical attitude against patriarchal absolutism by claiming that the patriarchal succession did not by itself constitute the king's right to sovereignty, and that the people's consent was its vital source.<sup>75</sup> Elsewhere in the work, Charleton even admitted the people's right of resistance: "the commands of kings and emperors, so far as they contradict any divine command, cannot impose an obligation to obedience."<sup>76</sup>

The duality or plurality of principles was, therefore, a central part of Charleton's understanding of the successful government of both the commonwealth and the individual person. In both realms, those dual governing principles were not yet on completely equal terms: the Crown and the rational soul were more noble than the other sources of authorities. Charleton noted that "divinity it selfe only excepted, nothing is more noble, nothing more sublime" than the Crown, and in a similar vein expressed that the rational soul was a more noble and rightful governor of man, "seated in a higher sphere of impassability, like to top of Mount Olympus."<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, the medical pneumatology he embraced consisted in two commanding parts with an autonomous principle and freedom assigned to each—the harmony that results in the happiness of the man. Charleton's message was that this mixed monarchy in man, so to speak, did not necessarily end up in an anarchical disaster, for the man as a *zoon patheticon* endowed with two governing principles of reason and hedonism, was capable of achieving happiness, virtue, and morality. That seems to have been the lesson driven home by Charleton's experience of the English Revolution.

## CONCLUSION

I have tried to demonstrate that Charleton's medical pneumatology involved the metaphoric representation of the breach of the former political order, and that it was product of his attempt to recast an earlier understanding of man as being framed within a fixed and stable hierarchy into a more dynamic one. The imminent question is: how typical was this presentation during the period? How important was the Civil War and the Interregnum to the subsequent development of the English perceptions of the workings of the human mind and its relation to the body? There are some intriguing cases. William Cole, an Oxonian doctor, wrote in 1689 that in epilepsy the soul escaped the body, because "her Royal seate happens to be overwhelmed with such a deluge . . . [and] thus becomes so unfit for her residence."<sup>78</sup> Margaret Cavendish, an eccentric and enigmatic bluestocking, expressed a view somewhat similar to Charleton; she describes the sensitive and rational parts of the person as being essentially on equal terms: "I do not mean, the senses are bound to obey the rational designs; for the sensitive corporeal motions, have as much freedom of self-moving, as the rational."<sup>79</sup>

These cases were, however, too isolated, and the use of political metaphor in the account of medical and natural philosophical pneumatology seems to have waned in the period. Although one is tempted to generalize Charleton's case and to look at the subsequent development of sensualist and hedonistic psychology and moral philosophy in the same light of the isomorphic understanding of the governing principles in man and the commonwealth, such generalizations, at present, are impossible. The question of to what extent the Civil War and the Restoration shaped the post-Revolutionary English idea of man's mind and its relation to the body remains unanswered.

## NOTES

1. Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660* (London: Duckworth, 1975); P. M. Rattansi, "Paracelsus and the Puritan Revolution," *Ambix* 11 (1963), pp. 23-32; *idem*, "The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in Restoration England," *Ambix*, 12 (1964), pp. 1-23; Margaret Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976); Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). The core of the argument is lucidly summa-

rized in Margaret Jacob, *The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), pp. 73–104.

2. J. R. Jacob and Margaret Jacob, "The Anglican Origins of Modern Science: the Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution," *Isis* 71 (1980), pp. 251–67; Margaret Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution*.

3. Margaret Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

4. Theodore M. Brown, "The Mechanical Philosophy and the 'Animal Oeconomy': a Study in the Development of English Physiology in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1968), remains the fullest account of the transformation of the understandings of man under the mechanical philosophy.

5. There is no general survey of pneumatology during the period. The following works by John Henry are quite useful: "A Cambridge Platonist's Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute* 49 (1986), pp. 172–95; "Medicine and Pneumatology: Henry More, Richard Baxter, and Francis Glisson's *Treatise on the Energetic Nature of Substance*," *Medical History* 31 (1987), pp. 15–40; "The Matter of Souls: Medical Theory and Theology in Seventeenth-Century England," in *The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, eds. French and Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 87–113.

6. The encouragement of the Lateran Council is nicely discussed in Emily Michael and Fred S. Michael, "Two Early Concepts of Mind: Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989), pp. 29–48, especially pp. 31–34.

7. The epitome of the much-propagated association of Hobbesian materialism and libertinism was Earl of Rochester. See Mintz, *Hunting of Leviathan*, pp. 134–46.

8. Joseph Glanvill, *Saducismus Triumphatus: or, Full and Plain Evidence concerning Witches and Apparitions*, 3d ed. (London: S. Lowndes, 1689). This edition includes Henry More's writings as well. For the ideological background of Glanvill's and More's involvement in demonology, see Thomas Harmon Jobe, "The Devil in Restoration Science: the Glanvill-Webster Debate," *Isis* 72 (1981), pp. 343–56.

9. Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (1936; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

10. J. F. Senault, *The Use of the Passions . . . Put into English by Henry Earle of Monmouth* (London: for J. L. and Humphrey Moseley, 1649).

11. Charleton's political publications were: *An Imperfect Pourtraicture of His Sacred Majesty Charles the II* (London: Henry Herrigman, 1661); *The Harmony of Natural and Positive Divine Laws* (London: Walter Kettilyb, 1682); *Chorea Gigantum, or the Most Famous Antiquity of Great-Britain, Vulgarly Called Stong-Heng* (London: Henry Herringman, 1663).

12. There is no modern English study of Walter Charleton. See Anthony à Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses*, 4 vols. (London: Lackington et. al., 1820), vol. 4, 752–56; *Dictionary of National Biography*; *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*. I could not make use of a German work on him, Sabina Fleitmann, *Walter Charleton (1620–1707), "Virtuoso": Leben und Werk* (Frankfurt: Verlag Peter Lang, 1986). I owe this reference to Andreas Holger-Maehle of Wellcome Institute.

13. For Descartes's dualism, see John Cottingham, *Descartes* (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1986), pp. 107–34. Its relation with Descartes's medical ideas is discussed in Richard B. Carter, *Descartes' Medical Philosophy: the Organic Solution to the Mind-Body Problem* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

14. Marjorie Nicolson, "The Early Stages of Cartesianism in England," *Studies in Philology* 26 (1929), pp. 356–74; G. A. J. Rogers, "Descartes and the English," in *The Light and Nature: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science presented to A. C. Crombie*, eds. J. D. North and J. J. Roche (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 281–302. For Descartes's impact on physiology in England, see Theodore M. Brown, "Physiology and the Mechanical Philosophy in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 51 (1977), pp. 25–74.

15. Tom Sorell, *Hobbes* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). Samuel Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), remains the best study of seventeenth-century criticism of Hobbesian materialism.

16. See Alan Gabbey, "Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646–1671)," in *Problems of Cartesianism*, eds. Thomas M. Lennon, et al. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982), pp. 171–250. See also the works by John Henry cited in n. 5.

17. John Locke's and Thomas Lower's transcriptions of Willis's Sedleian lectures were published as *Thomas Willis's Oxford Lectures*, trans. and ed. Kenneth Dewhurst (Oxford: Stanford Publications, 1980). The lectures were expanded into *Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*, trans. Sydney Portage (London: Thomas Dring, 1683). The circumstances of the lectures is meticulously studied by Robert G. Frank, "Thomas Willis and His Circle: Brain and Mind in Seventeenth-Century Medicine," in *The Language of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought*, ed. George Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 107–46. The same author's *Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) provides a detailed account of the medicine at Oxford then.

18. There has recently been controversy over whether Gassendi should be considered the source of Lockean philosophy. A sensible assessment of the problem is given in Fred S. Michael and Emily Michael, "The Theory of Ideas in Gassendi and Locke," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990), pp. 379–99. The relation between Locke's philosophy and Willis's physiology is nicely discussed in John P. Wright, "Locke, Willis, and the Seventeenth-Century Epicurean Soul," in *Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought*, ed. Margaret Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 239–58.

19. Walter Charleton, *Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana: or a Fabrick of Science Natural, upon the Hypothesis of Atoms* (London: Thomas Heath, 1654). See Robert Kargon, "Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean Atomism in England," *Isis* 55 (1964), pp. 184–92.

20. Walter Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* (London: James Magness, 1674). This work has been mistaken as an English adaptation of J. F. Senault's *De l'usage des passions* (1641). See Richard Hunter and Emily Cattler, "Walter Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* (1674) and J. F. Senault's *The Use of Passions* (1649): A Case of Mistaken Identity," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Science* 13 (1958), pp. 87–92.

21. See Pierre Gassendi, *Pierre Gassendi's Institutio Logica 1658*, ed. with

- trans. and intro. by Howard Jones (Assen, The Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1981), pp. LI-LIV; idem, *The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi*, ed. and trans. Craig B. Brush (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1972), pp. 412-13; idem, *The Fifth Set of Objections*, in Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, pp. 179-240, esp. p. 237. Secondary sources on Gassendi include Howard Jones, *Pierre Gassendi, 1592-1655: An Intellectual Biography* (Nieukoop: B. de Graaf, 1981); Margaret Osler, "Baptizing Epicurean Atomism: Pierre Gassendi on the Immortality of the Soul," in *Religion, Science, and Worldview: Essays on Honour of Richard S. Westfall*, eds. Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 163-83.
22. Walter Charleton, *The Immortality of the Human Soul, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature* (London: Henry Herringman, 1657); idem, *Ephesian Matron* (London: Henry Herrington, 1659), p. 39. Although the latter is a fiction, it has a plenty of medical and natural philosophical argument.
23. Charleton, *Enquiries into Human Nature*, in *VI Anatomie Praelections in the New Theatre of the Royal College of Physicians in London* (London: Robert Boulter, 1680), pp. 404-5.
24. René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, eds. John Cottingham, et al., 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-91), vol. 1, p. 325.
25. Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, in *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 345.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 355. See also *Meditations, Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 59; "There is a great difference between the mind and the body inasmuch as the body is by its nature always divisible which the mind is utterly indivisible."
27. Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 346.
28. Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions*, "Epistle Prefatory." Charleton could make use of Thomas Willis's *Cerebri Anatome* (1664), which rejected Descartes's localization of the soul at pineal gland on a comparative anatomical basis. See Hansruedi Isler, *Thomas Willis, 1621-1675: Doctor and Scientist* (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 91-92.
29. Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions*, "Epistle Prefatory." See also *ibid.*, p. 4.
30. *Descartes' Conversation with Burman*, translated with introduction and commentary by John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 28.
31. Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions*, "Epistle Prefatory."
32. Quite expectedly, Charleton's and Willis's doctrine of the dual souls in man met with some criticisms from the Cartesian view point, to which they produced counter-criticisms. See Samuel Haworth, *Anthropologia: or, a Philosophic Discourse concerning Man* (London: Stephen Foster, 1680), pp. 30-33; Charleton, *Enquiries*, pp. 391 and 387-88; Willis, *Two Discourses*. "Preface to the Reader."
33. Timothy Bright, *A Treatise of Melancholie* (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1586), pp. 37-38.
34. Lazare Riviere, *The Universal Body of Physick* (London: Henry Eversen, 1657), p. 32; *Anthropologie Abstracted: or the Idea of Humane Nature Reflected in Briefe Philosophical, and Anatomical Collections* (London: Henry Herringman, 1655), p. 97.
35. In his *Passions of the Soul*, Descartes wrote of the animal spirits: "what I am calling spirits here are merely bodies: they have no property other than

- that of being extremely small bodies which move very quickly." Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, pp. 331-32.
36. Walter Charleton, *The Immortality of the Human Soul, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature* (London: Henry Herringman, 1657), p. 60. See also idem, *Enquiries*, pp. 403-4. Thomas Willis maintained that the study of the corporeal soul helped one to understand the nature of the incorporeal one by contrast. See Willis, *Two Discourses*, pp. 1 and 38-44. As for Willis's metaphysical use of the comparative anatomical observations, see W. F. Bynum, "The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of the Brain," *Isis* 64 (1973), pp. 445-69.
37. For Hammond, see John W. Pecker, *The Transformation of Anglicanism, 1643-1660. With Special Attention to Henry Hammond* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969).
38. Henry Hammond, *A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament* (London: Richard Royston, 1653), p. 711. Charleton, *Natural History*, "Epistle Dedicatory"; idem, *Enquiries*, p. 404. Willis, too, cited "our Hammond." See Willis, *Two Discourses*, "The Epistle Dedicatory" and pp. 40-41. As for Charleton's anxiety about the association with Manichaeism heresy, see Charleton, *Immortality*, p. 70; idem, *Natural History*, "Epistle Prefatory."
39. Charleton made his Episcopalian attitude clear in *An Imperfect Pourtraicture of His Sacred Majesty Charles the II*, p. 18.
40. Charleton, *Natural History*, "Epistle Prefatory."
41. See E. Ruth Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute, 1975).
42. Daniel Sennert, *The Institutions or Fundamentals of the Whole Art, Both of Physick and Chirurgery* (London: Lodowick Lloyd, 1656), p. 25; André du Laurens, *A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholick Diseases: of Rheumes, and of Old Age* (London: Ralph Iacson, 1599), p. 73.
43. Edward Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man* (London: Robert Bosstock, 1640), p. 45; J. F. Senault, *The Use of the Passions*, p. 7.
44. Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, p. 43. At the same time, they did not acknowledge soul's tyranny over the body, and argued that the lower faculties were not the slaves of the higher ones. See Reynolds, *ibid.*, pp. 47-48; Senault, *The Use of Passions*, p. 15.
45. Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, pp. 43-44.
46. Bright, *A Treatise of Melancholy*, p. 61. See also Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Holbrook Jackson (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), bk 1, p. 167, where the author contrasted the freedom of rational will and the bodily determination of sensual appetite.
47. Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions*, p. 45. See also Senault, *The Use of Passions*, p. 16.
48. Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, p. 46. See also Senault, *The Use of Passions*, pp. 15-17.
49. Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, p. 44-45. For the symbolism of the world turned-upside-down, see Barbara Babcock, ed. *The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
50. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 3 and "Epistle Prefatory." Here he cited Kenelm Digby's *Two Treatises* (Paris: Gilles Blazot, 1644).
51. Charleton, *Natural History*, "Epistle Prefatory" and p. 41.



52. Charleton, *Natural History*, "Epistle Prefatory." Most probably, here Charleton echoed Hobbes (whom he mentioned in "Epistle Prefatory"), who maintained that man consists in the internal motions which are called passions, of which the most fundamental are appetites and aversions. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 118–30.
53. Charleton, *Epicurus's Morals* (London: Henry Herrington, 1655), p. 13. This work is one of the earliest English translation of Epicurus's work. See Thomas F. Mayo, *Epicurus in England, 1650–1725* (London 1934).
54. Charleton, *Natural History*, pp. 169–70.
55. Samuel Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).
56. William Bates, *Considerations of the Existence of God, and of the Immortality of the Soul* (London: Brabazon Aylmer, 1676), pp. 161–75.
57. Charleton, *Ephesian Matron*, pp. 75–96. He wrote, for example, "so much as it [personal and "platonique" love] cannot be without diversity of sex, and tendeth as violently to the same end, as the general or indefinite love doth, viz. to the act of procreation; and in both those respects, doth participate of that sensual pleasure, which accompanies the indifferent love." (*Ibid.*, p. 89.) The work nicely anticipates the legendary promiscuous debauchery of the court of Charles II.
58. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 81. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 57–58.
59. Laurens, *A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight*, p. 118.
60. Charleton, *Natural History*, "Epistle Prefatory," pp. 52–54.
61. Some historians have attempted to look at the reproduction of the perception of the society into medical theories. Relevant works include: Christopher Hill, "William Harvey and the Idea of Monarchy," in *The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 160–81; John V. Pickstone, "Bureaucracy, Liberalism and the Body in Post-Revolution France: Bichat's Physiology and the Paris School of Medicine," *History of Science* 19 (1981), pp. 114–42; Owsei Temkin, in "Metaphors of Human Biology," in *Science and Civilization*, ed. Robert C. Stauffer (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), pp. 169–94.
62. Here Charleton borrowed almost verbatim Willis's account of the passions, in Willis, *Two Discourses*, p. 43. A parallel study of Willis's politics will be fruitful.
63. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 58; Willis, *Two Discourses*, p. 43.
64. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 58; Willis, *Two Treatises*, p. 43.
65. Charleton, *Ephesian Matron*, p. 40.
66. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 59; Willis, *Two Treatises*, p. 43.
67. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 59.
68. For the rhetoric of the king as an immortal being like the phoenix, see Paul Hammond, "The King's Two Bodies: Representation of Charles II," in *Culture, Politics, and Society in Britain, 1600–1800*, eds. Jeremy Black and Jeremy Gregory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 13–48, 36. Milton the republican thought otherwise, i.e., that the king is mortal and the republic is immortal. See Carolyn A. Edie, "The Popular idea of Monarchy on the Eve of the Stuart Restoration," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 39 (1975–6), pp. 343–73, 361. The classic examination of the theme of the mortality and immortality of kings is E. H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
69. The imprint of the Civil War and the Interregnum onto the Restoration

- mind, even onto the rhetoric and ideology employed to celebrate the return of the King has been discussed in Hammond, "The King's Two Bodies"; Gerald Reedy, "Mystical Politics: The Imagery of Charles II's Coronation," in *Studies in Change and Revolution: Aspects of English Intellectual History, 1640–1800*, ed. Paul J. Korshin (Menston: Scholar Press, 1972), pp. 19–42.
70. See J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavelian Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). For a discussion of a wide spectrum of political theories during 1640–1660, see Austin Woolrich, "Political Theory and Political Practice," in *The Age of Milton: Backgrounds to Seventeenth-Century Literature*, eds. C. A. Patrides and R. B. Waddington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 34–71. Some parts of Senault's *Use of Passions* sounds like an absolutist pneumatology. See, for instance, *ibid.*, A7 and pp. 15–17.
71. See Carolyn G. Edie, "Right Rejoicing: Sermons on the Occasion of the Stuart Restoration," *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library* 62 (1979–80), pp. 61–86; *idem*, "The Popular Idea of Monarchy on the Eve of the Stuart Restoration," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 39 (1975–6), pp. 343–73.
72. Charleton, *Chorea Gigantum*, p. 47. The work includes the poem "To my honour'd friend Dr Charleton" by John Dryden.
73. Charleton, *Chorea Gigantum*, p. 48. Charleton's idea on the origin of kings' power added fuel to the subsequent debate: John Webb, the publisher of Jone's tract, strongly denied Charleton's claim and addressed to Charles II that "all your just and rightful predecessors . . . have held dominion over this island, by unquestionable and indubitable right of succession, in no age by popular and tumultuary clamour." John Webb, *A Vindication of Stone-Heng Restored* (London: Tho. Basset, 1665), A2. Anthony à Wood wrote that he was a man of little learning. See *Athenae Oxonienses*, vol. 4, pp. 756.
74. The ideology of the "ancient constitution" has been discussed in J.G.A. Pocock.
75. Charleton, *The Harmony*, pp. 172–181. He expressed the idea in his commentary to the fifth precept of the Decalogue, which was the very underpinning of the patriarchal political theory. See Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha and Other Political Writings*, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gordon J. Schochet, *Patriarchalism in Political Thoughts* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975); *idem*, "Patriarchalism, Politics and Mass Attitudes in Stuart England," *The Historical Journal* 12 (1969), pp. 413–441.
76. Charleton, *The Harmony*, p. 11.
77. Charleton, *Natural History*, p. 56.
78. William Cole, *A Physico-Medical Essay Concerning the Late Frequency of Apoplexies* (Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1689), p. 25.
79. Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, *Grounds of Natural Philosophy*, 2d ed. (London: by A. Maxwell, 1668), pp. 127 and 63. In some of her natural philosophical works, influence of Hobbes is manifest, who was once a tutor to her husband, William Cavendish. Charleton translated Margaret's biography of her deceased husband into Latin in 1668.